Gregory Kulacki

China project manager and senior analyst

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Gregory has lived and worked in China for the better part of the last twenty-five years facilitating exchanges between academic, governmental, and professional organizations in both countries. Since joining the Union of Concerned Scientists in 2002, he has focused on promoting and conducting dialog between Chinese and American experts on nuclear arms control and space security. His areas of expertise are Chinese foreign and security policy, Chinese space program, international arms control, cross-cultural communication. He received his Ph.D. in Political Theory from the University of Maryland, College Park in 1994. Gregory also blogs on the Equation.

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Gregory's Latest Posts

Rethinking Nuclear Deterrence: Korea and No First Use

"Scenes of Atomic Weapons Explosions": A Chinese propaganda poster. The quote from Chairman Mao on the left reads: "The atomic bomb is a paper tiger used by the US reactionary clique to scare people. It appears frightening but in reality it is not."

A Chinese propaganda poster titled, “Scenes of Atomic Weapons Explosions.” The quote from Chairman Mao in red on the left reads: “The atomic bomb is a paper tiger used by the US reactionary clique to scare people. It appears frightening but in reality it is not.”

There are US defense and foreign policy experts who assert that history proves the United States should retain the option to use nuclear weapons to prevent non-nuclear attacks against the United States and its allies. The evidence supporting that assertion is questionable.

The historical record in Europe is ambiguous. Although there was no Soviet attack against Western Europe during the Cold War it is difficult to prove US threats to use nuclear weapons were responsible for preventing it. There is convincing evidence, however, that the fear of US nuclear weapons failed to deter the People’s Republic of China (PRC) from attacking US forces in Korea. Read more >

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Japan Can Accept No First Use

Estimated effects of a single Chinese nuclear warhead targeting the U.S. naval base in Yokosuka in retaliation for U.S. first use of nuclear weapons in a conventional war with China.

Estimated effects of a single Chinese nuclear warhead targeting the U.S. naval base in Yokosuka in retaliation for U.S. first use of nuclear weapons in a conventional war with China.

Most Japanese security professionals currently prefer the United States maintain the option to use nuclear weapons first. But should President Obama declare that the sole purpose of U.S. nuclear weapons is to deter and, if necessary, respond to the use of nuclear weapons by another country, extensive interviews with those same Japanese security professionals indicate they would accept the change. Read more >

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China in Focus #19: Peaches, Plums and the Challenge of Cross-Cultural Communication

https://www.google.com/search?q=%E6%A1%83%E6%9D%8E%E4%B8%8D%E8%A8%80,+%E4%B8%8B%E8%87%AA%E6%88%90%E8%B9%8A&newwindow=1&client=safari&rls=en&source=lnms&tbm=isch&sa=X&ved=0CAcQ_AUoAWoVChMIjf27_p-QyAIVxy-ICh1vGgN8&biw=1266&bih=676#imgrc=_

Chinese President Xi Jinping likes to use Chinese idioms in his public remarks. While speaking to a select group of U.S. luminaries in Seattle on the first day of a state visit to the United States, President Xi dropped the following Chinese gem on his non-Chinese speaking audience: 桃李不言, 下自成蹊. Read more >

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China in Focus #18: Ground Truth

Thirty years ago this month my first year in China came to an end. What I remember most is that I returned to the United States assured I knew less about China than when I first arrived. It was a year of unlearning. The ground truth of my experience in the country did not support the narratives about China I studied in school.

Every time I return to China the unlearning continues. Read more >

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NPT Brief: Keeping Chinese Nuclear Weapons Off Hair-Trigger Alert

An overwhelming majority of NPT member states agree that keeping nuclear weapons on hair-trigger alert presents an irresponsibly high risk of an accidental or mistaken launch. The final report of the last NPT review conference, held in 2010, included a requirement to lower alert levels. The United States is doing its best to make sure that requirement is stripped from the final language of the 2015 report, despite the wishes of many close U.S. allies. Read more >

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