Ominous Votes by the NRC

, senior scientist | October 23, 2015, 12:15 pm EDT
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In two separate decisions earlier this month, the Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) voted to change its procedures in ways that will weaken protection of nuclear power plants against terrorist attacks and will defer for many years important upgrades to the security of nuclear waste in dry storage casks. And more changes in this direction are likely to come.

NRC commissioners Oct. 2015 (Source: NRC)

NRC commissioners Oct. 2015 (Source: NRC)

If the threat of terrorism against critical infrastructure in the United States has indeed diminished to the extent that these actions are appropriate, UCS never got the memo.

In fact, according to a report recently released by the House Homeland Security Committee, the Islamic State has to date inspired or directed 17 attack plots on targets within the United States. Justice Department officials said this month that domestic terror groups pose an even greater threat to the U.S. than foreign groups like the IS. And the NRC staff, as recently as March of this year, said publicly that the general credible threat to the nuclear sector has not decreased since the September 11, 2001 attacks.

Yet by their actions, the NRC commissioners appear to be partying as if it’s still September 10. In doing so, they are failing to uphold their obligation to protect public health and safety and assure the common defense and security. Instead, they are handing the nuclear industry just about everything that it wants.

Even more notification for force-on-force tests

One decision concerns the protocols for NRC-run “force-on-force” inspections of nuclear power plant security. I’ve written often about the importance of these inspections, currently conducted every three years. They involve the use of a team of mock terrorists to test the ability of nuclear plant security forces to protect their facilities from radiological sabotage attacks that could cause a reactor meltdown or damage to spent fuel in storage pools. (Spent fuel stored in dry casks is not designated as a target for force-on-force tests: a big loophole.)

The tests are crucial because the NRC learned a long time ago that having a good security plan on paper was not a guarantee that a plant security force could effectively carry out the plan in practice.

The tests are intended to be as realistic as possible, but they have significant limitations. For one thing, they lack the element of surprise, which is one of the most critical tactical advantages of a real attacking force. A nuclear site must be notified well in advance of the inspection to ensure that security forces know that it is not a real attack and to give the plant management time to implement measures to maintain safety and security during the tests. However, the more advance notice the NRC provides, the more time and resources become available for plant management and security forces to prepare for the test, and the less representative the test will be of an actual surprise attack.

In the force-on-force test program that was carried out in the 1990s, nuclear plants were given 6-12 months’ advance notice, and plant managers spent hundreds of thousands of dollars getting ready. (Even so, about 50% of the plants failed the test.) But after the 9/11 attacks, when the program was revamped and strengthened, the NRC staff mandated that the notification period should not be greater than 12 weeks because “a longer notification window might not provide as accurate an assessment of typical security force readiness.”

But in a paper dated (perhaps inauspiciously) September 11, 2015, the staff proposed that the notification window be increased again to 9-15 months so that the inspections could be included in the regular periodic notice of all upcoming inspections that are sent to licensees, which according to the staff would “minimize disruptions to the NRC and licensees without impacting the integrity of the inspection program.” And on October 6, the four sitting NRC commissioners voted unanimously to approve the change.

Now, if only the NRC could schedule a real attack 15 months in advance, we’d be all set.

Delaying safety requirements for dry casks

In the second decision, the commissioners voted to approve another staff proposal submitted on September 11 of this year and postpone the schedule for developing new requirements for protecting spent fuel in dry cask storage from sabotage by five years. (Commissioner Jeff Baran wanted a 1-year delay but was outvoted.) This move will delay the effective date of the rule from the end of 2018 to the end of 2023.

There are a number of good reasons for implementing this rule sooner rather than later, but perhaps the most important one is that the current rules do not provide adequate protection of dry casks from certain types of terrorist attack scenarios, as the NRC has acknowledged publicly.

While UCS strongly supports the expedited transfer of spent fuel from dangerously overstuffed pools to dry casks, which will reduce risk, we also want to ensure that fuel in the dry casks will not pose a significant danger to the public. Although we have concerns with the proposed security rules, they provide the best hope for upgrading dry cask protection to address any outstanding vulnerabilities.

Also, given the significant number of reactors that will be decommissioned over the next decade and will need to build or expand dry cask facilities to store their spent fuel, it makes no sense for the NRC to wait to develop the new requirements, which could affect the types of casks that utilities will purchase and the way they will be stored. (This assumes, of course, that the new security rules ever get implemented at all. Given the experience of a recent rulemaking on containment vent filters that the NRC first delayed and then terminated, a rulemaking deferred is often a rulemaking denied.)

An ominous trend

We see these votes as manifestations of an ominous trend. The nuclear industry has complained bitterly about the security upgrades imposed after September 11 and has lobbied incessantly to roll them back, even though the security threat has not lessened. It seems that it finally has the full support of the NRC’s senior management and the commissioners.

The NRC needs to stop protecting the industry and start defending the public.

Posted in: Nuclear Power Safety, Nuclear Terrorism Tags: , , ,

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  • Jerry Koske

    I don’t believe that the NRC is relaxing 10 CFR 50.54hh which requires each licensee to have procedures and plans to address extensive plant damage events similar to 9/11 type events.

    • No, they are not relaxing it. All remaining plants will have both that post-9/11 requirement, as well as fully implemented FLEX provisions by next year.

  • Richard Solomon

    Even though the horse is already out of the barn, so to speak, these two votes still warrant a letter to one’s Senators and/or Rep in the House to alert them to the fact that the NRC, once again, is serving the industry’s profits rather than the public’s safety.

  • It’s ironic that the only actual assaults against nuclear power plants have been by antinuclear zealots of the same ideological persuasion as this author:

    Those with actual operational responsibility for inflicting harm on a large population know that they have a much greater chance of success by attacking soft targets like apartment buildings, oil and chemical refineries, and sporting events.

    The massive security structures and heavily armed 24/7 guard forces at US nuclear power plants ensure an attack would have one outcome – dead or apprehended terrorists. And they know it.

    Even in the unlikely event that substantial plant damage is sustained, the offsite consequences would be much smaller than Mr. Lyman would have you believe:

    • BasM

      IS, the Taliban, etc. have many reasons to hit back at US.
      If they hit e.g. Indian Point NPP with a stable wind towards New York City such that massive radiation escapes,
      then the damage will be much greater. It may deliver the evacuation of Manhattan and even the whole of NYC.
      It will make the organizer far more famous than Bin Laden.

      They can use up-to-date armor penetrating rockets or a big plane loaded with heavy material (depleted uranium?), etc. French super-phenix NPP was attacked once by an old WW2 grenade (to small and old to have effect)…


    Thank you for addressing the issue of dry cask storage. I am a resident of Oceanside, so my neighbor is San Onofre, which is now closed and in decommissioning preparations. It concerns me that the NRC has allowed the Coastal Commission to take over their duties for making decisions that have the potential to seriously impact public health.
    The utility, Edison, had secret meetings with certain influential Coastal Commission members for weeks before the matter of indefinite onsite dry cask storage of spent fuel in thin Holtec steel casks was to be put up for a vote. In fact, approval was accidentally announced in advance of any vote. This is the influence Edison has over every level of government. Protecting the public is nobody’s concern, at least not in government. Even Jerry Brown defends these mediocre storage containers, which could leak in just 15 years and cause a Chernobyl level disaster. Every federal state, county, and city coalition, commission or agency whose employees make a comfortable taxpayer funded living to stand up for the people who live amongst this nuclear waste do not seem to realize who they work for. Edison is not their employer. Exelon is not the leader of our U.S. Congress. We elect people to represent our interests and the people they appoint to these positions in the E.P.A, FDA, Dept of Agriculture, and the NRC should, at the very least, have a basic grasp of the health impacts that go along with their decisions. If a bunch of internet activists know more about DNA mutations and other consequences of humans getting irradiated by nuclear waste, then maybe it is time to circulate statewide ballot initiatives to get rid of all these useless government employees and replace them with scientists, activists and concerned citizens who are in no way subservient to the corporations that provide energy, weapons, or any related products. We can’t afford to have a bunch of politicians blowing up the whole world by accident because they bowed down to the almighty dollar.

  • BasM

    It’s amazing that USA doesn’t have research regarding the m/f birth effects around nuclear waste storage and NPP’s.
    Especially since it is cheap (if population registers are accurate).

    Results of such research caused this summer the premature closure of Germany prime nuclear waste storage site, Gorleben. The research showed highly significant increases in the m/f sex ratio of new born of >10% in the area 20-30km away from the nuclear storage site*). Similar was found around all other such nuclear sites:
    And for NPP’s in France, Zwitserland, etc:

    The state (Niedersachsen) ordered a due diligence study, to be executed by researchers (Hoopmann etal) who didn’t believe the found results. That study also extended the research to a bigger area. It delivered results which not only confirmed the previous results but even reinforced them strongly (to the unpleasant surprise of the authors):,d.bGQ&cad=rja

    This created more discussion as the radiation measurement network at the fence of the nuclear waste storage and 2km away at the village Gorleben showed little radiation:
    Which is in line with the found m/f sex increase; hardly any increase for distances <4km (see picture).
    The explanation can be found in Teil2; sheet 21 etc of this PPT:

    So the state organized a conference with presentations of all opponents and the original researchers. You can find all presentations at the bottom of mid column:
    Apparently the original researchers / authors (Scherb etal) won the discussion at they got the assignment to write the final report (Okt.2014):
    The matter was escalated to federal government which reached agreement with the nuclear utilities to close the site prematurely:,gorleben1738.html

    *) As the male DNA is only 3% smaller, this indicates that ~75% of the DNA & sperm is killed because it is hit by radiation particles due to increased radiation. As the radiation will often only harm the DNA it implies less healthy newborn (less immune system), lower intelligence, increased levels of birth defects, etc. for next generations.