The CMRR: Not Dead Yet

, Washington representative and senior analyst | September 25, 2012, 8:07 pm EDT
Bookmark and Share
RLUOB Los Alamos National Laboratory

CMRR’s phase one, the radiological laboratory, also known as the part that got built.

The Chemistry and Metallurgy Research Replacement-Nuclear Facility (CMRR-NF) is not quite dead, but it is headed that way. The Union of Concerned Scientists already made its case for that outcome. We supported the administration’s proposed five year delay for the new nuclear weapons-related plutonium facility at Los Alamos National Laboratory. As we said, “there is no clear need for the CMRR-NF as currently proposed.” It simply isn’t needed.

Recent developments have come in a “two steps forward, one step back” slide toward delaying the facility. As we’ll see below, Senator Carl Levin (D-MI) argues such delay means the eventual demise of the facility, but the administration continues to argue to the contrary.

Most recently, two steps toward delay came with the Senate’s passage, over the weekend, of the Continuing Resolution that will fund the federal government when the 2013 fiscal year starts on October 1. The good news is that there is no money in the CR specifically for the CMRR.

It wasn’t for a lack of trying on the part of CMRR supporters. Perhaps most ominously, in June Senator Jon Kyl (R-AZ) organized a bipartisan letter that was signed by Senator Ben Nelson (D-NE), the chair of the strategic forces subcommittee of the Senate armed services committee, and four other Senators. The letter called on the administration to provide full funding for the CMRR.

That letter followed an earlier, more partisan letter organized by Sen. Kelly Ayotte (R-NH), in which she was joined by 11 other freshman Republican senators threatening to not support any arms control treaties unless CMRR was fully funded.

In the end, these letters did not persuade Congressional appropriators, who wrote the CR. This isn’t surprising, as both the House and Senate appropriations committees supported the administration’s position by denying funding for CMRR in their FY2013 bills.

No Language Prohibiting CMRR

The bad news is that does NOT mean that the CMRR could not be funded. There is no provision in the CR or elsewhere that would prohibit using FY12 or FY13 money for the CMRR, if the administration and National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA) chose to do so. The CR was perhaps the last best opportunity for supporters to get funding for the CMRR, but it does not mean they are giving up.

Specifically (like every department and agency) the NNSA must submit a spending plan 30 days after the CR takes effect that says what it plans to do with the money it are allocated.

Fortunately, there are lots of indications that the NNSA has no interest in allocating any money for the CMRR.

Quite the opposite. The NNSA is disbanding the CMRR design team and is trying to spend the money that the FY12 budget devoted to the project on its alternative plutonium strategy. That strategy is the plan for plutonium work NNSA is proposing as a result of the five-year delay in the CMRR.

Objections to Reprograming

That is where the “one step back” comes in. Sen. Levin, chair of the Senate Armed Services  Committee, is not happy with NNSA’s plan. On September 19, he sent a letter to the Department of Energy in which he “defers action on this [NNSA] request” to reprogram the money from the CMRR to the alternative plutonium strategy.

This creates a problem for NNSA. Whenever any government agency wants to adjust its plans and spend money somehow other than Congress first approved it for, they must get the approval of all four relevant congressional committees that handle authorization and appropriation. In this case, that is the House and Senate armed services and energy and water development committees.

The appropriations committees presumably have or will sign off happily on repurposing the FY2012 money toward the alternative plutonium strategy.

The House Armed Services Committee, however, previously took an adamant course in opposition. In their bill, they went so far as to deny ANY money for an alternative plutonium strategy unless the CMRR was fully funded. They undoubtedly would be the last player to agree to the switch.

That makes Sen. Levin and the SASC the key player. If they can be persuaded, the HASC might have a harder time standing alone.

Administration’s United Front

To make the case, I’m told that the Pentagon leadership, the NNSA, and the head of Los Alamos, Charlie McMillan, have banded together to push for the CMRR delay and the alternative plan.

Even Gen. Robert Kehler, head of U.S. Strategic Command, who has testified earlier in the year that he was satisfied with the FY13 plan but worried about the longer-term plan, seems to be growing more confident. In August, he said “I do think that we are beginning to close on a way ahead here that will have us have sufficient interim capability while we look to get the long term solution back on track. … It’s still under discussion. I think we’ve had … very good discussions about the way forward.”

Some details about the alternative plutonium plan have emerged, with initial reporting by John Fleck of the Albuquerque Journal and further explanations from Greg Mello of the Los Alamos Study Group. Sometimes called “Plan B,” the proposal includes significant upgrades to the recently-completed Radiological Laboratory, Utility, and Office Building (RLUOB – photo above). That upgrade would further expand the amount of plutonium that could be worked on at the lab. A tunnel would also be added between the lab and Plutonium Facility 4 (PF-4), where pits are made. The existing vault within PF-4 would be improved. Pit needs would be met by a combination of the current production capacity at PF-4 and reuse of existing pits. All the pieces seem to be falling into place to make the weapons labs and—more importantly—the DOD happy.

But Sen. Levin’s letter, coming from someone who normally would agree with the administration, indicates concerns remain in Congress.

His letter makes a case against the CMRR delay. It states that on September 13, NNSA submitted the request to reprogram the $120 million that was appropriated for CMRR in FY12 toward the alternative plutonium strategy. It notes the estimate prepared by LANL that the alternative plutonium strategy will cost between $800 million and $1.13 billion.

Then his letter assumes that a five-year delay in CMRR will increase costs by 25% and combines that with the alternative strategy costs to get a total estimate of $5.6-$7.2 billion for the CMRR project. This increase, the letter states, could be too much to bear, noting “Pragmatically, the Committee has concluded that deferral of at least ‘five years’ is essentially a cancelation.”

His letter concludes by stating that “The Committee is willing to provide funding for the alternative plutonium strategy as long as a portion of the $120 million is utilized to reconstitute the CMRR-NF facility in support of the New START Treaty. The Committee requests a meeting with the NNSA and Executive Branch stakeholders to reverse this deferral so that the short and long term plutonium needs of this nation can be met.”

The Final Outcome

The supporters of CMRR are in a distinct minority. It is the House and Senate authorizing committees alone that support building the facility. The administration, including the Pentagon, the NNSA, the weapons labs, and the Congressional appropriations committees all support the delay.

If I were a betting man, I’d side with the appropriators and the Pentagon, as that is a fairly powerful combination that usually gets its way. But the final word is not yet spoken, and will undoubtedly await Congressional approval of the alternative plutonium plan.

 

 

Posted in: Nuclear Weapons Tags: , , , ,

Support from UCS members make work like this possible. Will you join us? Help UCS advance independent science for a healthy environment and a safer world.

Show Comments


Comment Policy

UCS welcomes comments that foster civil conversation and debate. To help maintain a healthy, respectful discussion, please focus comments on the issues, topics, and facts at hand, and refrain from personal attacks. Posts that are commercial, self-promotional, obscene, rude, or disruptive will be removed.

Please note that comments are open for two weeks following each blog post. UCS respects your privacy and will not display, lend, or sell your email address for any reason.

  • Dear Stephen —

    Thank you for this interesting, useful, and as far as I know accurate account. Some comments:

    * I don’t think there was any significant chance that CMRR-NF could have been the subject of an “anomaly” in the CR. (I for one was disappointed that Weapons Activities as a whole received a plus-up, when the program is riddled with waste and management problems. NNSA has not produced any of the legally-required planning documents, let alone a CMRR “Plan B.”)

    * So what is Plan B and what analysis justifies its elements? There are unresolved issues, from the necessity and cost of the proposed short tunnel ($140 million at last ken; no tunnel has ever been necessary for that mission at LANL before) to the degree and cost of upgrades to the first CMRR building, to the cost of the PF-4 vault cleanout, to the mission and location of the environmental testing facility for pits. The National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA) compliance of the whole is in doubt. We also do not understand the relationship of Plan B to NNSA’s ambitious plans to produce plutonium dioxide for the MOX program, and additional Pu-238 heat sources in the same facility. We do not have an integrated facility and mission plan plutonium sustainment at the LANL site, let alone for all the sites involved. There is every indication that LANS, the LANL operating contractor, seeks a sort of careless aggrandizement of plutonium missions. Any space conflict or difficulty is just a reason for more money or buildings. The “can’t do” attitude we see from LANL when it comes to pit production capacity is complemented by a “can do” attitude for every other mission that comes along that competes with pit production.

    * Part of the resistance to Plan B may be a form of negotiation for future facilities (or for program payments in lieu of facilities).

    * Looking at the big picture, Congress’s actions are increasingly falling behind events. This is what happens when no applicable legislation is passed. You mention the disbanding of the project teams — this is quite true. This began in March and is very far along. Ninety percent of project activity has already ceased. Also, future funding streams for CMRR-NF have been claimed by other higher priorities — which have also had huge estimated cost overruns. There just is no money as well as no need for CMRR, and this problem will not improve in the coming year or years. The resistance we see from a few remaining members of Congress, to the extent it is not negotiation or posturing, is not reality-based.

    * Since not all the stockpile will be retained in future years (the cost/deterrence ratio will be seen as too high for the nth platform or warhead) the mission need for an additional huge nuclear facility for plutonium at LANL will be even more conspicuously absent.

    * At bottom, CMRR was a neoconservative project, put forward to help produce the RRW, as was understood at the time by the House appropriators at least, who tried to kill it for five years running. CMRR-NF reflected the priorities of the early Bush Administration. When first proposed under Clinton, CMRR was to be a Hazard Category III facility or Radiological Facility, not anything like a Nuclear Facility that subsequently arose. NNSA has shifted back to the reality of their need. Not all the way, but somewhat.

    Thanks again, Greg Mello

  • Bill Beveridge

    Ihave been a committed anti nuclear weapons advocate since the 1950’s. The skills of Scientists and Engineers involved in the nuclear industry would be of more use in scociety. In the 1970’s engineers in the UK working for Lucas Aerospace formed a Shop Steward’s alternative group of engineers who proposed several projects for products outside the Arms economy. They included a portable kidney dyalisis kit, a road/tail vehicle, improved wind turbine designs. All of which were dissmissed by the company as ‘not profitable’. I believe some of those innovations would be viable some 50 years later. There is always an alternative. Engineers and scientists actually understand economics better than so called experts. We got to the Moon and Mars, we can sort out the sorry mess poliician have made of Earth’

  • yes, certainly there ARE always limitless numbers of alternatives to nuclear weapons and energy businesses- and life-enhancing ons at that! esp. w/ all those billions of peoples’ money.