U.S. and Chinese leaders both seek a denuclearized North Korea. But they disagree, fundamentally, on how that can be achieved. U.S. analysts and observers frame that disagreement inaccurately, contributing to misunderstanding that unnecessarily undermines strategic trust between China and the United States. Read More
October 2003: The Bartlett administration’s equivalent of Kurt Campbell explains why a North
Korean piano player cannot be allowed to defect to the United States.
Recent U.S. press reports suggest Chinese frustration with recent North Korean provocations could lead to a shift in Chinese policy towards their belligerent neighbor. These reports are based on comments by former Obama administration officials responsible for U.S. foreign and security policy in the region. Kurt Campbell, the recently resigned assistant secretary of state for East Asian affairs, told an audience at the Johns Hopkins School of Advanced International Studies “there is a subtle change in Chinese thinking.” Former senior director for East Asian affairs on the National Security Council Jeffrey Bader told the New York Times this change means China “will be much more aggressive, much more fed up and much more prepared to treat North Korea differently than in the past.”
Chinese Central Television (CCTV) coverage of recent events on the Korean peninsula suggests rumors of a shift are exaggerated, perhaps even completely false. In fact, a Saturday evening broadcast on CCTV News suggested the United States may be moving slightly towards China’s position, rather than the other way around. Chinese official statements continue to call on both sides to exercise restraint. Chinese commentary remains even handed, noting North Korean violations of UN prohibitions on nuclear and missile tests while at the same time criticizing the unwillingness of the United States to supply North Korea with the security guarantee it seeks. U.S. and North Korean concerns are conveyed as having equal standing.
U.S. officials have argued for years that China would eventually change its position on North Korea, largely because of the U.S. belief China’s unwillingness to pressure their neighbor would lead to adverse security outcomes, such as a nuclear armed Japan. In Japan and America’s Nuclear Posture, UCS presented strong evidence to the contrary. Nevertheless, the idea that China would change its policy on North Korea because of security concerns is so well-entrenched in the minds of U.S. officials and reporters that this “subtle change” in China’s thinking about North Korea was taking place in a 2003 episode of The West Wing.
There is no visible sense that China’s propaganda machinery is preparing the Chinese public for major events on the peninsula or for a change in Chinese policy. There is little sense of emergency or crisis. The North Korean situation is a story, but not the major focus of recent news coverage. Most of last week the Chinese news was dominated by stories about “Qing Ming” holiday activities. CCTV 13, China’s 24-hour news channel, gave more air time to a feature on the wildebeest migration in the Serengeti than to the situation in North Korea. This weekend, the focus of the news turned towards the BoAo Forum in Hainan: China’s answer to Davos.
The main Chinese themes on North Korea have not changed as a result of the current situation. China would like to see a relaxation of tensions, renewed regional dialog and economic reform. They do not appear to believe there is a high risk of armed conflict. They argue sanctions are counterproductive and the United States should engage directly with the leaders of North Korea at a high level in order to provide the sense of security they now seek through nuclear weapons and ballistic missiles. The one change repeated to me by several Chinese colleagues this week is China now believes North Korea is determined to build a functional nuclear deterrent. They blame the United States for that development. It is, as the Chinese Foreign Ministry spokesperson said, “regrettable.” But there is no apparent justification for assuming it will be a turning point for Chinese foreign policy.
Since North Korea’s missiles are in the news and seem to be generating confusion, I’m giving here my understanding of where these various systems stand, based in part of my modeling of their capabilities. Read More
Thirty years ago tomorrow—March 23, 1983—President Ronald Reagan’s “Star Wars” speech spawned an enthusiasm for missile defense that even today dominates defense discussions in Washington. Much has changed in those 30 years, so where are we? Read More
North Korea’s launches of its Unha-3 rocket in April and December 2012, along with the recovery and analysis of debris from the December launch, have provided a lot of new information that was not previously available. That information has allowed me and others to reassess our earlier conclusions about Pyongyang’s rocket, and has led to some significant changes. Read More
In assessing the ballistic missile threat, a key issue is estimating how long it might take countries like North Korea and Iran to build missiles that could carry a nuclear-warhead-sized payload to the United States. Both countries use liquid fuel in their satellite launchers and have developed that technology further than solid fuel. As a result both countries could develop a liquid intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM) before a solid ICBM. Read More
Press reports now say South Korea has recovered four pieces of the first stage of the Unha-3 rocket that North Korea launched on December 11 (U.S. time). Since all these pieces were found in approximately the same area, they must all have come from the first stage. Read More
There have been a lot of odd statements about North Korea’s satellite in the press over the last few days. I thought it would be useful to talk about some of them and try to clarify some misconceptions. Read More