Trump Wants a New Low-Yield Nuclear Weapon. But the US Has Plenty Already.

, analyst | June 18, 2018, 8:52 pm EDT
Bookmark and Share

The Trump administration’s Nuclear Posture Review (NPR), released in February of this year, calls attention to the composition of the US nuclear arsenal and its adequacy as a deterrent. The NPR calls for a new lower-yield submarine-launched nuclear warhead, arguing that it is needed to “counter any mistaken perception of an exploitable ‘gap’ in U.S. regional deterrence capabilities.” We decided to put together the chart in Fig. 1 to illustrate the range of nuclear weapons already available in the US arsenal.

One thing that this visual immediately makes clear is that it would be difficult to perceive any real gap in US capabilities—the existing arsenal certainly does not lack for nuclear options for any occasion.

Fig. 1 (Source: UCS)

The blue bars in the image above each represent the explosive power, in kilotons, of an existing weapon or weapons in the US arsenal. As you can see, the US already has weapons with yields ranging from 0.3 to 1,200 kilotons—from 1/50 to 80 times the yield of the roughly 15 kiloton bomb that the United States dropped on Hiroshima in WWII (represented by the dotted bar in the chart). On the lower-yield side, the US currently deploys around 450 weapons, sometimes called “tactical nuclear weapons,” that have options for yields ranging from 0.3 to 10 kilotons. These include both an air-launched cruise missile and gravity bombs. It also deploys another roughly 2,000 weapons with higher—in some cases much higher—yields, ranging from 45 to 1,200 kilotons.

Still, the administration is proposing to fill this non-existent gap with a new lower-yield submarine-launched warhead, called the W76-2—the orange bar in Fig. 1. This new warhead would reportedly have a yield of 6.5 kilotons—right in the middle of the range of existing US low-yield nuclear options. “Low”-yield in the case of 6.5 kilotons, however, is a pretty questionable description. As noted above, the nuclear bomb that the US dropped on Hiroshima in WWII had a yield of roughly 15 kilotons—a little more than twice that of the proposed new weapon. It killed 100,000 people and reduced the city to rubble.

Labeling such deadly and destructive weapons “low-yield” may give leaders the dangerous impression that using them is not as serious as using a nuclear weapon with a larger yield, and that their use would not lead to full-scale nuclear war. But in reality, no one knows what would happen if a nuclear weapon—of any size—were once again used in war. As Defense Secretary James Mattis has said,

“I don’t think there’s any such thing as a tactical nuclear weapon. Any nuclear weapon used at any time is a strategic game changer.”

The administration’s choice of language in the NPR rationale for the new warhead is also interesting. It does not argue that such a gap actually exists, but that it is concerned that an adversary might mistakenly perceive one. While perceptions are always an important consideration in deterrence, it’s useful to keep in mind the fact that 1) we don’t actually know what our adversaries are thinking, and we’ve been dangerously wrong in past guesses; and 2) trying to ensure that no country could ever possibly perceive that it might have any type of military advantage is how arms races happen. Most relevant in the current situation, it is how the US and Soviet Union ended the Cold War with arsenals of tens of thousands of nuclear weapons each. This type of thinking is not about deterrence, but about “escalation dominance” and “nuclear warfighting,” both of which are even more unstable and dangerous.

Recognition of the particular dangers of low-yield nuclear weapons has, until recently, been widespread and bipartisan among US military and political leaders. Over the past several decades, the United States has eliminated much of its arsenal of low-yield nuclear weapons for this and other reasons. The Trump administration’s new move to develop more of these weapons is a step in the wrong direction that is both unnecessary and dangerous.

Posted in: Nuclear Weapons Tags: , , , ,

Support from UCS members make work like this possible. Will you join us? Help UCS advance independent science for a healthy environment and a safer world.

Show Comments


Comment Policy

UCS welcomes comments that foster civil conversation and debate. To help maintain a healthy, respectful discussion, please focus comments on the issues, topics, and facts at hand, and refrain from personal attacks. Posts that are commercial, self-promotional, obscene, rude, or disruptive will be removed.

Please note that comments are open for two weeks following each blog post. UCS respects your privacy and will not display, lend, or sell your email address for any reason.

  • Peter Huessy

    The low yield weapons we have in our arsenal and those we plan to build have nothing to do with the stupid idea of nuclear war fighting, a phrase the opponents of a robust nuclear deterrent invented to make it appear as if those supporting nuclear modernization actually want to go around the world using nuclear weapons at every opportunity.

    The UCS knows better but nonetheless perpetuates this mythology. Having a variety of ways to deter an adversaries use of nuclear weapons–to stop ANY use of nuclear weapons–is to have a credible ability to respond so that your adversary seriously believes you have such a credible capability and that such second use or retaliatory use would effectively illustrate vividly to any attacker that the further use of any such weapons would be futile–thus the initial use of such weapons would also be futile and thus would be deterred.

    Thus, no use of nuclear weapons means no warfighting. That is the incentive the US seeks to give all adversaries.

    However, a recent letter headlined by Jerry Brown and Barney Frank says that any retaliatory use of a nuclear weapons by the United States could not be controlled and would lead to what nuclear expert Paul Nitze called the Armageddon option—- or an all-out nuclear exchange.

    Stop a minute and consider what the letter says or strongly implies—we actually will not respond to your nuclear attack with any nuclear weapons of our own because such an exchange would lead inevitably to a wider, uncontrolled nuclear war.

    What you have just done is tell your adversary that you will NOT respond to a nuclear attack with a response using nuclear weapons. What you have done is also given a nuclear armed adversary a green light to use nuclear weapons first–without fear of a nuclear response.

    The result? You have dramatically lowered the bar or threshold at which nuclear weapons would be used. And you have told an adversary your only two serious options are surrender and not respond, or risk all out nuclear warfare, and thus commit suicide.

    • Aaron1Tovish

      If only it were true that US nuclear weapons are solely for retaliation against nuclear attack! Unfortunately that has NEVER been the case, and since 1954 has not been the case for NATO either. Under longstanding policies, nuclear weapons are meant to deter conventional attack and, if that fails, to compel retreat through escalation to nuclear weapon use. As the article’s author says, this is believed to require “escalation domimnance”, so that the enemy backs down rather than retaliating in kind as most variants of deterrence prescribe. She is right that this could lead to “nuclear warfighting.”
      I could not find an Internet link to any letter written by Jerry Brown and Barney Frank. Perhaps, Peter Hussey can provide one so that the rest of us can reach our own conclusions as to what it “strongly implies.” Until then, there is something to chew on: If a ruthless attacker has incinerated enough cities to bring the world to the brink of nuclear famine, what would, actually, be the point of pushing the world over that threshold, by burning more cities?