jamesafitzpatrick


The “Race” to Resolve the Boiling Water Reactor Safety Limit Problem

, director, Nuclear Safety Project

General Electric (GE) informed the Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) in March 2005 that its computer analyses of a depressurization event for boiling water reactors (BWRs) non-conservatively assumed the transient would be terminated by the automatic trips of the main turbine and reactor on high water level in the reactor vessel. GE’s updated computer studies revealed that one of four BWR safety limits could be violated before another automatic response terminated the event.

Over the ensuring decade-plus, owners of 28 of the 34 BWRs operating in the US applied for and received the NRC’s permission to fix the problem. But it’s not clear why the NRC allowed this known safety problem, which could allow nuclear fuel to become damaged, to linger for so long or why the other six BWRs have yet to resolve the problem. UCS has asked the NRC’s Inspector General to look into why and how the NRC tolerated this safety problem affecting so many reactors for so long. Read more >

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Frazzled at FitzPatrick

, director, Nuclear Safety Project

Fission Stories #199

The James A. FitzPatrick nuclear plant near Oswego, New York has one boiling water reactor (BWRs) with a Mark I containment design. Water flowing through BWR cores is heated to boiling with the steam flowing through turbine/generator to make electricity. Steam exits the turbines and flows past thousands of tubes within the condenser. Water from the lake flowing inside the tubes cools the steam and transforms it into water. The condensed steam is pumped to the reactor vessel to make more steam. Read more >

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You Might be Operating an Unsafe Reactor If…

, director, Nuclear Safety Project

Disaster by Design/ Safety by Intent #43

Disaster by Design

There are currently two empty positions on the five-member Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC). If comedian Jeff Foxworthy were nominated and confirmed to become a Commissioner, you wonder how he would finish the nuclear safety equivalent of his “redneck” routine?

You might be operating an unsafe reactor if …

This Ending Intentionally Blank Read more >

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Nuclear Plant Containment Failure: Isolation Devices

, director, Nuclear Safety Project

Disaster by Design/Safety by Intent #32

Disaster by Design

Containment structures at nuclear power plants have multiple purposes. Containments protect vital safety equipment from damage caused from external events like high winds and the debris they can fling. And containments protect nearby communities against radiation released from reactor cores damaged during accidents. Read more >

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Nuclear Plant Containment Failure: Pre-Existing Damage

, director, Nuclear Safety Project

Disaster by Design/Safety by Intent #31

Disaster by Design

Federal regulations require that nuclear plant containments withstand the temperature, pressure, hydrodynamic forces, humidity, and other consequences from design basis accidents and limit the amount of radioactivity to the atmosphere. By limiting the radioactivity release, containments minimize the harm to nearby populations and the environment.

The surest way for a containment to be damaged after an accident and be unable to fulfill this safety function is for it to be damaged before the accident starts. Read more >

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