waterford


Empty Pipe Dreams at Palo Verde

, former director, Nuclear Safety Project

Regulation and Nuclear Plant Safety #3

In July 2004, Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) inspectors at the Waterford nuclear plant in Louisiana discovered that a portion of piping in a standby emergency system that would provide makeup water to cool the reactor in event of an emergency had been kept emptied of water, jeopardizing the ability to prevent core damage. This finding was shared with owners of similar reactors across the country. Days later, workers at the Palo Verde nuclear plant in Arizona discovered that sections of the emergency system piping for all three reactors was being deliberately emptied of water. Read more >

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Benny Hill Explains the NRC Approach to Nuclear Safety

, former director, Nuclear Safety Project

The Nuclear Regulatory Commission’s safety regulations require that nuclear reactors be designed to protect the public from postulated accidents, such as the rupture of pipes that would limit the flow of cooling water to the reactor. These regulations include General Design Criteria 34 and 35 in Appendix A to 10 CFR Part 50.

Emergency diesel generators (EDGs) are important safety systems since they provide electricity to emergency equipment if outside power is cut off to the plant—another postulated accident. This electricity, for example, would allow pumps to continue to send cooling water to the reactor vessel to prevent overheating damage to the core. So the NRC has requirements that limit how long a reactor can continue operating without one of its two EDGs under different conditions. The shortest period is 3 days while the longest period is 14 days. Read more >

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Command and Control

, former director, Nuclear Safety Project

Disaster by Design/Safety by Intent #17

Disaster by Design

Command and control is often used to describe the authority of military leaders in directing armed forces in battle. It can also refer to senior managers at nuclear power plants and the resources they command and control to fend off safety challenges.

Faulty intelligence, or flawed situational awareness, undermines command and control when leaders have the wrong understanding of hazards and/or response capabilities. Read more >

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Nuclear Power(less) Plants

, former director, Nuclear Safety Project

Disaster by Design/Safety by Intent #3

Disaster by Design

The primary purpose of commercial nuclear power plants in the U.S. is to generate electricity. When not fulfilling that role, nuclear power plants that are shut down require electricity to run the equipment needed to prevent the irradiated fuel in the reactor core and spent fuel pool from damage by overheating. The March 2011 accident at Fukushima Daiichi in Japan graphically illustrated what can happen when nuclear plants do not get the electricity they require. Read more >

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Fire at the Nuclear Plant

, former director, Nuclear Safety Project

Disaster by Design/Safety by Intent #2

Disaster by Design

The March 1975 near-miss at the Browns Ferry nuclear plant in Alabama involved a fire in the cable spreading room. This room is located directly below the control room for the Unit 1 and Unit 2 reactors. Electrical cables from switches, gauges, and alarms on the control panels are routed through the floor into the cable spreading room where they radiate out to equipment throughout the plant. The fire burned for over six hours, destroying thousands of electrical cables. All of the emergency core cooling systems were disabled for the Unit 1 reactor and the majority of those safety systems were disabled for the Unit 2 reactor. Only heroic actions by workers prevented core meltdowns that fateful day. Read more >

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